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Abstract
Company-level pacts between the management and the works council are often preferred in 
comparison to agreements between employers’ association and unions because the former 
negotiating partners are better informed about the economic situation of a company and have 
fewer goal conflicts than the latter. Moreover, these company-level pacts might reduce the ‘hold-
up’ problems which arise once specialized investment is made. Therefore, this article investigates 
whether such agreements affect firm-level investment. Based on the IAB Establishment Panel 
Survey 2001–2010 the study indicates that the adoption of a company-level pact leads to a higher 
investment rate than in other firms driven by reinvestment. However, the Great Recession has 
damped this positive influence. From the econometric analysis the article does not detect any 
increase in investment during the negotiation phase. After the expiration of a company-level pact, 
lower reinvestment and a small increase in net investment take place.
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It is widely acknowledged that German reforms of the past decade have been designed 
with competitiveness and employment in mind; thereby the low wage increases have had a 
material effect on export competitiveness in a range of manufacturing industries, such as 
industrial machinery. (Spence and Hlatshwayo, 2011: 37)
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Introduction
In the old days, the German bargaining system, in principle, recognized only two players, 
employers’ associations and trade unions. These two players negotiated wages and work-
ing conditions, such as working time, holidays, etc. and these negotiations resulted in 
collective bargaining agreements that defined the standards for the majority of the employ-
ees. An exception to this bargaining system at the industry level were large-scale enter-
prises, which directly concluded a (firm-level) bargaining agreement with the trade 
unions. Since the middle of the 1980s, there has been an increasing demand for more 
flexibility in the German bargaining system. Due to the introduction of opening clauses 
into the collective as well as the firm-level bargaining contracts, representatives of estab-
lishments and workers often have the authority to agree upon deviations from the stand-
ards defined in the basic agreements if some triggering event occurs. Such an event might 
be a bad economic situation or strong competitive pressure. The application of an opening 
clause usually becomes contractual within a company-level pact (CLP). In practice, trade 
unions have to agree on the application, i.e. they have to decide whether the triggering 
event indeed occurred and whether the magnitude of the deviations is justified.
From an employer’s perspective, CLPs are completed to reduce wages or, more gen-
erally, labour costs, and as a consequence thereof, to reduce prizes or increase available 
funds to finance investments that are necessary for maintaining competitiveness or 
avoiding economic problems. Although it is, a priori, not obvious whether labour costs 
induce economic problems or whether reducing labour costs is an adequate strategy, 
many establishments try to minimize such costs by adopting company-specific devia-
tions based on an industry-level wage contract. In fact, in recent years, we have observed 
a tendency towards more local bargaining and flexibility in the negotiations of opening 
clauses and CLPs for employment and competitiveness in Germany as different types of 
CLPs have been observed. On the one hand, agreements exist that are characterized by 
company-specific deviations in an industry-level contract regarding the acceptance of 
reduced wages. On the other hand, there are CLPs that are implemented or stipulated in 
establishments without collective contracts or that allow collective agreements to go 
unaltered. A deal regarding work hours, a stipulation about increased flexibility or an 
agreement regarding modernization of capital stock are typical elements of CLPs. 
Moreover, these contracts are associated with safeguarding firm locations in accordance 
with the firm’s global sourcing and production strategies. Increasingly, companies prom-
ise not only measures to stabilize employment but also ways to improve the firm’s com-
petitiveness through investment programmes.
Previous empirical investigations regarding CLPs have focused on the impact of such 
agreements on employment, training and economic positions of firms. Until now, how-
ever, detailed investigations about the effects of CLPs on investments have been absent.
This article seeks to fill the research gap and applies econometric methods to study 
firm investment decisions at the level of the individual plant. Using the IAB Establishment 
Panel Survey, we investigate heterogeneity in behaviour between different types of 
plants. Structural information about the establishments, beginning with information 
about the establishments before the CLPs were finalized, is necessary to evaluate the 
impact of CLPs. These data are provided by the IAB Establishment Panel Survey.
Bellmann et al. 503
Our major intention is to analyse the investment activities of establishments with 
CLPs in comparison to the investment activities of establishments without these pacts. 
Empirically, we intend to show under what conditions CLPs induce higher investments 
and under what conditions they induce lower investments than establishments without 
CLPs. This overall objective is split into secondary aims, and the following questions are 
investigated. Are there differences between replacement investments and net invest-
ments of these two groups of establishments? Are there higher fundamental reductions in 
investment activities during the great international crisis of 2009 compared to the pre-
crisis period? Does the firm investment behaviour differ during negotiations from that 
during and after the contract period of the CLPs? From a theoretical perspective, there is 
not a unique hypothesis regarding investment effects of CLPs. We find different channels 
of explanation, and the results are partially contradictory, as demonstrated in the short 
literature review presented in the next section. Further, as the role of the financial crisis 
is not unambiguous, the outcome is not known in advance. Accordingly, the empirical 
investigation is conducted without any fixed expectations regarding the results.
The article is structured as follows. The second section provides a short overview of 
the related literature. The third section describes the IAB Establishment Panel Survey 
data and discusses methodological issues. The fourth presents empirical results. The fifth 
section concludes the article.
Literature related to company investments, industrial 
relations and company-level pacts
Business investment and industrial relations
Traditional investment functions are generally modelled with respect to classical and 
accelerator theories. Profits and changes in demand are the major determinants and the 
estimates are based on aggregated data. However, during the last 20 years, economists’ 
focus has shifted to the analysis of investment at the firm level. Many studies on firm-
level investment are based on the standard accelerator specification. A good example is 
Mairesse et al. (1999).
The impact of the union representation of employees on firm investment is considered 
in several studies. From a theoretical point of view, unions may exert a negative as well as 
a positive impact on firm investment. In a traditional model, unions exogenously set 
wages and may or may not propel firms to substitute capital for expensive labour (Addison 
et al., 2007). Thereby, the degree of substitutability between capital and labour, as well as 
the effect of union representation on output prices, determine the ultimate effect on invest-
ment. If unions seek to expropriate quasi-rents, which arise once investment in specialized 
plant equipment has been made, the firms are confronted with a ‘hold-up’ problem. 
Therefore, a strong presumption in the literature on this topic is that greater worker repre-
sentation will depress investments in capital, because firms anticipate the ‘hold-up’ prob-
lem. For example, Bronars and Deere (1993) estimate a negative effect of unionization on 
investment, but the empirical significance of hold-up effects in the labour market is 
unclear. Existing studies suggest that wages respond to employer-specific gains in pro-
ductivity (e.g. Guertzgen, 2010). Card et al. (2011) argue that hold-up depends on whether 
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the wage bargaining process allows the firm to recoup its investment costs before splitting 
the rents with employees, and not on rent-sharing per se.
Freeman and Lazear (1995) argue that a works council acts as a communicator 
between management and workers, and thus the likelihood of a ‘hold-up’ problem might 
be reduced. This argument is especially true if the management and the works council 
successfully negotiate a CLP. Thereby, the firms’ investment incentives are increased. In 
contrast, an economic crisis tends to decrease the investment incentives because it dete-
riorates business expectations. In addition, strategies to cut wage costs can be regarded 
as a prerequisite for enhancing the firm’s ability to finance investment projects. Empirical 
studies on the effect of works councils do not provide a clear picture. The impact on 
innovation and investment is ambiguous. Addison et al. (2001, 2007) and Jirjahn (1998) 
cannot find proof of significant effects of the existence of a works council on process and 
product innovation. If the works council is not modelled as an exogenous variable but is 
instead instrumented as the probability of product but not of process innovation, then 
product innovation is significantly higher in establishments with councils (Addison 
et al., 1996). In middle-sized firms with 100–300 employees, the effects of the works 
council on investment in the Old and New Economy are significantly positive in 
Germany, where the indirect effects via reorganization and training of the workforce are 
dominant compared to direct effects (Hübler, 2003). Investment in the environmental 
protection in establishments is also positively correlated with the existence of a council, 
if the council is led by employees rather than firm managers (Askildsen et al., 2006).
Company-level pacts
Several studies commissioned by the European Foundation for the Improvement of 
Living and Working Conditions review both the large number of social pacts at the sec-
toral and national level as well as those at the company level (Freyssinet and Seifert 
2001; Sisson and Martin Artiles, 2000; Sisson et al., 1999; Zagelmeyer, 2000). Collective 
pacts for employment and competitiveness have been negotiated in many European 
countries at a national level based on a tripartite dialogue involving government, 
employer associations and trade union representatives. At the sectoral and company lev-
els, such pacts have primarily been agreed upon by management and employee repre-
sentatives. ‘The PESs – company level pacts – are adding to the pressure for 
decentralisation of collective bargaining observed in Western Europe since 1980. 
Sometimes they have benefited from the decline of sector-level negotiation (as in the 
UK), and sometimes they have been made possible by the widening of the field of 
responsibility bestowed upon company negotiation (as in France, Italy and Netherlands). 
In other countries, they reflect the introduction of “opening clauses” or “hardship 
clauses” into sector agreements (as in Austria and Germany)’ (Sisson, 2001: 606). In the 
United States and Canada, similar agreements have been negotiated through concession 
bargaining, which was a widespread practice in the 1980s (see e.g. Bell, 1995; Cappelli, 
1985; Eaton and Verma, 2006). A major difference between CLPs in Germany and con-
cession bargaining in North America is that contracts for CLPs are bilateral, meaning 
that not just employees abandon warranties. CLPs can be defined as give-and-take agree-
ments. In the German tradition of company co-determination, reciprocal commitments 
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are constitutive, and CLPs are more complex than a traditional firm’s agreement and 
include issues that are beyond traditional co-determination. In practice, there exists a 
wide range of specific arrangements. The management’s right to decide about invest-
ments can be limited, and personal and investment strategic decisions can be combined. 
Employers and employees both contribute their decision-making authority to the solu-
tion of a joint problem. Economic problems of an establishment, such as an acute crisis 
or a threatening loss of competitiveness, build the origins of CLPs.
In Germany, works councils can agree to company-specific pacts with management if 
there is no collective bargaining contract. However, the conventional case is a two-tier 
system whereby working conditions are negotiated at the industry level. The resulting 
industry-level bargaining contracts are binding in that management and works councils 
need the permission of the employer association and the trade union representatives if 
they agree on conditions that are less favourable for the employees than those stipulated 
in the relevant contract at the industry level. This means that, on the basis of the clauses 
and on the consensus of the respective union and employer association regarding the 
existence of an economic hardship or crisis, management and the works council must 
agree on the application of an opening clause and possibly stipulate to additional specific 
objectives. Therefore, in some cases, collective bargaining fulfils not only its traditional 
role of implementing legal provisions but also suggests that a crisis has been prevented 
or that the competitiveness has been improved. Collective bargaining is responsible for 
new tasks and responsibilities (Ellguth and Kohaut, 2008; Lesch, 2008) and works coun-
cils are involved in economic decision-making within the company (Sisson, 2001: 602).
With respect to working time, wages and work organization, management and works 
councils must agree on the conditions. The duration of a CLP must also be established. 
While it is possible that recorded CLPs are determined within the framework of specific 
company declarations or in employee labour contracts, it is also possible that only an oral 
acknowledgement serves as the basis of a CLP. As the formulations are not always exact, 
compliance with specific CLP agreements is not enforceable. In most cases, the consent 
is connected on the employer side to explicit pledges such as employment and location 
guarantees or investment programmes.
With respect to the contents of the contracts negotiated between management and 
works councils, a change in the importance of employment guarantees and investment 
programmes is observed. Massa-Wirth and Seifert (2004) report that while 71% of all 
agreements in 2003 contained clauses concerning the exclusion of layoffs initiated by the 
employer, only 20% of these agreements included employer pledges about investment 
programmes. In contrast, Bogedan et al. (2011) find that in 2009, 50% of all agreements 
excluded company-initiated layoffs and that 54% of these agreements contained the 
company’s pledge regarding investment programmes. These results suggest a conflict of 
interest within the CLPs between the goal to save jobs and to include investment pro-
grammes. Using data for the German mechanical engineering and electrical machinery 
industry sector in 2007, Lesch (2008) finds that employers’ pledges were mainly in the 
field of employment (75%), while investment guarantees were part of 34% of all 
agreements.
Agreements between management and the works councils are often preferred in com-
parison to those between employer associations and unions because the negotiating 
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partners in management and works councils are better informed than those in employer 
associations and unions about the economic situation of a company and they are less 
likely to have conflicting goals regarding the outcomes of a negotiation. However, these 
pacts face a structural problem as employee concessions are made before employers are 
able to redeem the pledges that they (the employers) have made to employees. This is 
demonstrated by Bogedan et al. (2011) who find that in 29% of all cases, elements of the 
agreement are broken, but not necessarily solved. If the relations between the manage-
ment and the works council are good, the probability of fulfilling the contract is greater, 
thereby increasing the works council’s trust in management and vice versa (Hübler, 
2005; Nienhüser and Hoßfeld, 2010a, 2010b). The medium- and long-term effects of 
CLPs on competitiveness are not under the employers’ control. Rather, they depend on 
the respective sector and the company’s overall market position within it, with prices and 
products being of special interest (as shown empirically by Sisson and Martin Artiles, 
2000).
Usually, management alone decides whether and how much the firm will invest. 
However, under a CLP, the works council and employees are either directly or indirectly 
involved in the decision-making process. Some pacts agree explicitly on investments for 
a specific location, while others are silent on this issue or include only general agreements 
regarding the modernization or updating of a firm’s capital stock. CLPs may provide a 
solution to the ‘hold-up’ problem as they prohibit unions from exploiting quasi-rents, 
which arise from firm-specific investments if wages are set simultaneously (or in conjunc-
tion) with investments. In the standard setting, under-investment arises because of the 
possibility of wage renegotiations by unions after the installation of sunk capital by the 
firm. However, with CLPs, often a binding agreement on wage moderation and other 
deviations from collective bargaining is signed before the installation of new capital.
As the main intentions of CLPs are to ensure employment stability and to improve 
firm competitiveness, employees abandon certain monetary and non-monetary warran-
ties while the employer adopts measures to stabilize firm employment. The literature 
focuses on the employment effect of CLPs (Sisson and Martin Artiles, 2000). Despite the 
widespread incidence of CLPs in some economic sectors, the number of companies 
adopting CLPs is rather limited. Company case studies are presented by Zagelmeyer 
(2010).
A discussion regarding the problems and features of CLPs can be found in Massa-
Wirth and Seifert (2005), Seifert and Massa-Wirth (2005) and Bogedan et al. (2011). A 
survey of work councils conducted by the Economic and Social Research Institute (WSI) 
explains the economic and institutional factors that influence the spread and composition 
of these concessionary agreements. Using data from the IAB Establishment Panel Survey 
2004–2006, Ellguth and Kohaut (2008) investigate the probability that a CLP negotiation 
will be successful and determine that CLPs are more widespread if the profit situation is 
weak, if work time accounts and works councils exist, if the works councils are not hin-
dered by the employer and if the establishments are large. The latter fact is in contrast to 
concession bargaining in North America. Bell (1995) has found that while small firms 
are more often engaged in concession bargaining, concessions are significantly less com-
mon in establishments with above-average performance, with low base wages or with 
relatively high union coverage rates.
Bellmann et al. 507
Econometric studies reveal various impacts of CLPs on employment (Bellmann and 
Gerner, 2012a; Bellmann et al., 2008; Hübler, 2005), on firm investments in additional 
training (Bellmann and Gerner, 2012b) and on the enterprises’ economic situation 
(Hübler, 2006). Investigations show that a CLP has a better chance to be successful if the 
initiative is begun by the employer, if a CLP is incorporated during a strong economic 
period for the establishment and if a proper package of measures is agreed upon. While 
renegotiations initiated by works councils have improved results in some cases, no silver 
bullet for all firms can be identified or suggested as idiosyncrasies of the firm must be 
considered (Hübler, 2005, 2006). A study by Bogedan et al. (2011) reveals that the rela-
tionship between the works council and management can be regarded as the decisive 
factor regarding the stability of the CLP. If the works councils assess the contract to be 
fair and the contract contains agreements regarding the preservation of the number of 
employees, the employers will likely fulfil the pledges they made.
To summarize our survey of the related literature regarding company investment and 
CLPs and regarding studies conducted using data at the establishment level that consider 
the effect of employees’ representation on a firm’s investment incentives, the effects of 
employee representation on firm investment incentives are ambiguous. CLPs appear to be 
of special interest because it can be expected that CLPs reduce the ‘hold-up’ problem, 
which, in turn, decreases the firm investment incentives despite the empirical evidence 
regarding these agreements. The effect of the CLP on employment, on firm training and 
on the economic situation of a firm is rather limited and is not always positive. This obser-
vation holds even when controlling for the different types, phases and durations of CLPs.




The German IAB Establishment Panel Survey of the Institute for Employment Research 
of the Federal Employment Agency (IAB) is a representative survey of German estab-
lishments employing one or more employees from the private sector, excluding agricul-
ture, forestry and fishing, covered by social insurance. The panel started in 1993 with an 
annual survey of West German establishments and was extended to East Germany in 
1996. Since 1996, more than 15,000 establishments have been included in the survey. 
The IAB Establishment Panel provides information on many labour market topics, 
including employment, wages, sales, bargaining levels, works councils, profit sharing 
and investments. Wave 2006 provides many details regarding CLPs including retrospec-
tive data. In following waves, it is also asked whether an establishment has a CLP, and, 
if so, when the pact was adopted. Furthermore, the duration of a pact is identified. We 
also know whether any negotiations on such arrangements currently persist, whether an 
agreement existed in the past and is now discontinued, and whether efforts to achieve 
such an agreement failed in the past.
Our investigation is focused on data for the period 2001–2009. Public sector estab-
lishments are excluded. The establishment-level capital stock is approximated by 
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applying the modified perpetual inventory approach proposed by Mueller (2008) that 
combines the firm’s i information from the IAB Establishment Panel with those of the 
industry’s depreciation rate.
The model and methods
The starting point of our firm-level investment analysis is the approach of Mairesse et al. 
(1999) who develop an accelerator model of investment with error correction where an 
autoregressive-distributed lag of length two (ADL(2,2)) is assumed.
The LHS variable is the growth rate of capital stock as a function of both growth rates 
and levels information. The error correction term is the difference between the log of the 
capital and that of the sales in year t-2. The investment ratio (Iit/Ki,t-1) is used as a proxy 
for the net growth rate of the capital stock where Iit is the investment in firm i for year t 
and Ki,t-1 is the capital stock at the end of year t-1. The basic estimation equation is as 
follows:
 ∆ ∆ ∆ ∆k k s s k s  sit 1 i t 1 2 it 3 i t 1 4 i t 2 i t 2 5 i= + + + + −( ) +− − − −δ δ δ δ δ δ0 , , , , , ,t 2 it u− +  (1)
where kit is the log of the capital stock, sit is the log of the sales in firm i for year t and uit 
is the error term, δ1 measures the short-run and δ4 is the coefficient of the error correction 
term, the long-run effect. We start with OLS estimates. Instrumental variables estimates 
are then employed due to possible endogeneity, and several robustness checks are carried 
out – see Appendix Tables A3–A4.
Our main objective is to investigate whether CLPs foster or hinder investment activi-
ties. Hence, it is assumed that in the investment ratio equation (1) the absolute term δ0 is 
not fixed but is rather a function of the dummy variable CLP. Furthermore, we extend 
this function by investment determinants, namely, by sector dummies (SEC) and firm-
specific characteristics. We control whether the firm follows an industry-wide central 
bargaining system (CB), has a works council (WOCO) and has adopted profit sharing 
(PS) so that
 δ δ δ δ δ δ δ0 00 0 0 0 0it 1 it 2 it 3 it 4 it it  CLP  CB  WOCO  PS  SEC= + + + + + .  (2)
These determinants are more or less time-invariant. If they are neglected, their influ-
ences are essentially components of unobserved firm fixed effects, although not com-
pletely, as changes are possible after some periods. Due to theoretical arguments and 
empirical results – see earlier – we expect δ02 < 0 and δ03 > 0. In firms with profit 
sharing, employees might hinder investments because the level of profits that can be 
shared with workers is lower if investment activities are high as investment costs 
reduce profits in the short-run. Kruse (1993: 49) expects the same effect from the view-
point of employers. He argues, ‘If employees collectively receive a predetermined 
fixed share of profits, they will naturally share in any increase in profits from new 
capital investments, thereby decreasing the return on profits for the firm’s owners. This 
decreased return would decrease the incentives for investment.’ From this perspective, 
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δ04 should be negative. However, one can also argue that investments increase future 
profits, in which the employees participate. Therefore, employees have an incentive to 
support successful investments. Under this framework, it makes sense that a profit 
sharing scheme is installed in a CLP together with investment promises by the employer 
and wage or other concessions made by the employees. This suggests that the sign of 
δ04 depends on whether employees are more focused on the short- or long-run consid-
erations of their decisions. Empirical investigations that do not consider CLPs often 
find only insignificant effects of profit sharing on investment (see e.g. Blanchflower, 
1991; Jirjahn, 1998).
In a next step we analyse the ‘phases of CLPs’, i.e. the adoption of a CLP and when 
the CLP is expired. Moreover, the investment effects of CLPs are not only compared 
with those firms without any CLP but also with those of firms which negotiate over a 
CLP. The intention of such a comparison is to find out whether investment effects can be 
observed during the bargaining period. The comparison with firms that failed to install a 
CLP involves a similar objective. And finally, we compare with firms that had a CLP in 
the past which has since expired.
Results
Descriptive statistics
At first glance, the means in Table 1 seem to confirm this basic idea. Firms with a CLP 
have on average higher gross investments per capital than other firms. In addition, this 
table shows that establishments that have planned or negotiated over CLPs have lower 
investment ratios compared to those that adopted a pact. This phenomenon is also the 
case for establishments that adopted CLPs in the past.
It can be inferred that investment ratios increase at the beginning of a pact (compared 
to the pre-pact period) but fall again when the pact expired. The comparison between the 
medians and the means demonstrates that the distribution of gross investment per capital 
is positively skewed. The majority of the data are found bunched to the left with a long 
tail to the right.
Table 1. Descriptive statistics of gross investment per capital 2006; number of observations, 
medians, means and standard deviations.
Establishment Observations Median Mean SD
(1) Without CLP 4594 0.1136 0.2348 0.3069
(2) With CLP 334 0.2067 0.2922 0.2921
(3)  Planned CLP – 
negotiations for CLP
41 0.2014 0.2893 0.3058
(4) CLP in the past 79 0.1612 0.2584 0.3067
(5) Planned but failed CLP 45 0.1965 0.2849 0.3264
Notes: The outliers of investment per capital (IpC) are eliminated, i.e. outside the 95% confidence interval. 
In other words, firms with IpC > 1.33 are neglected assuming that these are measurement errors.
Source: IAB Establishment Panel, 2006.
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The development of the investment per employee with respect to the duration of a 
CLP is depicted in Figure 1, where a kernel-weighted local polynomial smoothing 
approach is applied (Fan and Gijbels, 1996). The graph clearly shows that investments 
are slightly falling in the first phase of the CLP. Then, after approximately four years, we 
observe an increase in firm investment. The investment activities peak after roughly 
eight years, and then a sharp decline occurs. On average, the length of a company-level 
pact is 2.8 years with a standard deviation of 3.9 years. The frequency distribution of the 
length of a CLP in our sample is:
And that of the years of adopting a CLP is:
Figure 1. Investment per employee (IpE) with respect to the duration of company-level pact 
(CD).
Source: IAB Establishment Panel.
Number of years 0 1 2 3 4 5 > 5
Number of firms 306 624 419 248 131 82 234
Years of 
adopting a CLP
<=1990 1991–1999 2000–2002 2003–2004 2005–2006 2007–2008
Number of firms 24 131 149 426 964 350
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In 2006, in our sample, the average number of employees in firms without a CLP is 
124 and that in firms with a CLP is 794. In other words, large firms have a higher pro-
pensity to agree to a CLP. Approximately 8% of all firms have firm-level contracts, and 
approximately 7% of all firms have a CLP. Among the latter, 60% are involved in indus-
try collective bargaining, 22% have firm-level collective contracts and 28% have agreed 
opening clauses, which are a necessary condition in firms with industry-wide collective 
bargaining for adoption of a CLP.
Investment effects before and during the recession
Notably, we are mainly interested in the impact of CLPs. Table 2 presents the regression 
coefficients estimated for different investment equations. We can see that the CLPs have 
predominately positive but insignificant effects on the firm investment. If location 
investments are explicitly agreed upon in CLPs, the effect on total investments is signifi-
cantly positive (Bellmann et al., 2013: Table 7, line 1). In this case, the CLP coefficient 
is 0.2268 for the period from 2001 to 2009 and 0.1733 for the period from 2001 to 2008. 
Among the three investment variables (total investment, reinvestment and net invest-
ment) the negative coefficients refer to the net investment only. The latter coefficients are 
negative without any exceptions and are more often significant.
The separate presentation of Panels A and B in Table 2 is intended to show whether 
the Great Recession has an important influence on the relationship between CLPs and 
investment. The real gross domestic product (GDP) began contracting in the third quarter 
of 2008 in the United States, and by early 2009 was falling at an annualized pace not 
observed since the 1950s. In Germany, negative growth rates of GDP were observed 
from the fourth quarter of 2008 to the fourth quarter of 2009 compared with the previous 
Table 2. OLS and IV estimates of CLP effects on investment rate – standard model.
 OLS IV
N Coef. SE N Coef. SE
Panel A: 2001–2009
Total investment 16,599 0.0424 0.0614 16,470 0.1341 0.3618
Reinvestment 16,349 0.0625 0.0629 16,222 0.1192 0.2878
Net investment 16,354 −0.0202** 0.0083 16,222 −0.1316*** 0.0445
Panel B: 2001–2008
Total investment 12,546 0.0996 0.0810 12,564 0.2298 0.4807
Reinvestment 12,360 0.1179 0.0829 12,379 0.1381 0.2234
Net investment 12,363 −0.0156 0.0099 12,379 −0.1356*** 0.0168
Notes: * significant at the 10% level; ** significant at the 5% level; *** significant at the 1% level. For complete 
estimates of CLP effects on total investment of the standard model in Panel A, see Appendix Table A2. 
Cluster robust standard errors with respect to the firms are presented. In the IV estimates CLP is instru-
mented by a dummy ‘opening clause = 1, if yes; = 0 otherwise’, by a dummy ‘company agreement = 1, if yes; 
= 0 otherwise’ and by the total numbers of employees.
Source: IAB Establishment Panel, 2001–2010.
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year’s value. In principle Panels A and B in Table 2 demonstrate a related pattern, albeit 
estimates broken down by several years are considered – see Table A3. In this case some 
sharp differences are revealed. The positive effect of CLPs on total investment is evi-
dently lower if the major recession year 2009 is incorporated. The same phenomenon is 
true if we consider only reinvestment.
Furthermore, an IV estimator is applied and the results can be found on the right hand 
side of Table 2. The idea is that the adoption of a company-level pact is induced by 
investments, that the association between the introduction of a CLP and an investment 
decision is likely interdependent. A low initial level of investment by a firm increases the 
probability that a CLP will be introduced. An IV instead of an OLS estimator is used to 
avoid a possible simultaneous bias. As an instrument we employ an opening clause 
dummy (OC = 1, if an opening clause exists; OC = 0 otherwise). As already mentioned 
above, an opening clause means that a firm could deviate from the agreements of an 
industry-level contract, if some triggering event occurs, e.g. a bad economic situation or 
strong competitive pressure. We should note that a CLP is often adopted if an opening 
clause has already existed over a long period of time. However, we do not expect a direct 
effect on investment due to the existence of an opening clause. Furthermore, a dummy 
whether a company agreement exists, i.e. the establishment has a firm-level bargaining 
agreement, and the number of employees are used as additional instruments. The collec-
tive agreement dummy is employed because firms with such a regime do not need an 
opening clause to agree a CLP, but these firms have a higher propensity to adopt a CLP 
than other firms – see previous subsection and Table A1 in the Appendix. It is easier to 
install a CLP if a collective agreement exists because it is clear who the negotiating part-
ners are. Otherwise, the employees fear that the employer will dominate the negotiation. 
The number of employees is incorporated as we expect that large firms are more inter-
ested than small firms in CLPs – see previous subsection and Table A1 (Appendix). 
Clearly, the number of employees has a direct impact on the investment volume. 
However, a direct effect on the growth rate of the capital stock is at least not obvious.
The LIML instead of the 2SLS estimator is preferred, as we use three instruments. 
Donald and Newey (2001) have shown that for large numbers of instruments, the LIML 
should dominate the 2SLS in terms of MSE. Problematically, nearly all instruments may 
actually be weak instruments or exclusion restrictions may not be fulfilled. However, we 
find – see Table A1 in the Appendix – that the opening clause dummy, the collective 
agreement dummy and the number of employees are statistically significant determi-
nants of CLP using probit estimates. Stock-Yogo tests reject the null hypothesis that the 
instruments are weak and Sargan tests of overidentifying restrictions do not reject the 
null hypothesis that the instrument set is suitable (Bellmann et al., 2013: 14).
The comparison of the OLS and IV estimates in Table 2 shows some similarities and 
some differences: the CLP effect on total and replacement investment is insignificant. 
This is consistent with previous estimates regarding the influence of unions and works 
councils on investment – see earlier. It seems that CLPs have no effect on replacement 
and total investment. However, CLPs might stop a firm from facing a negative trend of 
reinvestment. The effect on net investment is negative and this sign is independent of 
whether the year of the Great Recession is considered. The existence of a CLP does not 
prevent the negative effect on firm net investment. Firms that are facing a critical 
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economic situation do not solve their problems by expansion, but by modernization. The 
firms are uncertain about whether the consolidation of employee and employer interests 
via CLP will be successful. Therefore, firms prefer a strategy of caution with the hope of 
a long-term recovery. The IV estimates compared with the OLS estimates reveal a 
stronger tendency to negative net investment effects and to positive reinvestment. In 
other words, the absolute coefficients of the instrumented estimates are higher than that 
of non-instrumented estimates. This result is consistent with other studies (e.g. Card, 
2001; Machin et al., 2012; Schultz, 2002). The comparison of Panel A and B in Table 2 
highlights that the Great Recession reduces the positive CLP effects on reinvestment, 
while the changes of the negative effects of a CLP on net investment are ambiguous. The 
success of a CLP is less likely during a crisis.
An examination of the complete estimates in Table A2, columns OLS and IV shows 
negative short-run (a lagged growth rate of capital stock) and long-run effects (the log of 
the capital-sales ratio). When the recession year 2009 is excluded, we find the same ten-
dency towards negative short-run and long-run effects. Low investment rates in the past 
and past under-investment compared to the equilibrium investment based on sales lead 
to more investment. The coefficients of industry-wide central bargaining (CB), works 
councils (WOCO) and profit sharing (PS) have the expected signs but the influence is 
insignificant. In Tables A3 and A4 (Appendix) the results of some robustness checks are 
presented. As can be seen, the basic outcomes do not vary qualitatively.
Phases of company-level pacts
Our previous results show that firms with a CLP have higher replacement and lower net 
investment rates than other firms where only the latter effects are statistically significant. 
Some possible reasons for this result and empirical hints were discussed in earlier sec-
tions. Additionally, we investigate, whether the different investment activities exist 
between establishments with and without CLPs:
•	 Induced during the negotiation phase;
•	 Caused by CLP coming into effect;
•	 Emerging during the contract period of the CLP;
•	 Continuing once the CLP has expired.
It is necessary to investigate the effectiveness of CLPs during the different phases. 
Otherwise, an assessment of investment activity can have negative consequences. 
Negotiating partners become impatient with investment efforts or the timing of invest-
ments may be unsuccessful. In order to test whether the positive investment effect of 
CLPs is directly due to the adoption of a CLP by a firm or whether investment activities 
are induced during the contract period of a CLP, the left hand side of Table 3 is presented, 
where the dummy CLP is substituted by another dummy. This is adopted CLP, such that 
CLPit = 1, if the CLP is started in firm i for year t, otherwise CLPit = 0. The adoption 
induces significantly strong reinvestments. This result exceeds, on average, the invest-
ment level by firms with a CLP during the contract period and by firms without CLPs at 
all. During the contract duration, the elevated investment activity declines as we see in 
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comparison of the analogous estimates in Table 2, although these estimates are not com-
pletely comparable. The effect on the net investment rate of a firm is also positive as the 
result of an adoption of a CLP, in contrast to that of all CLP firms. We should mention 
that the total investment effect of the adoption of a CLP is not strongly affected by the 
recession – compare line ∆ total investment in Panel A and B of Table 3.
Overall, CLPs induce positive initial effects on firm investment, but they do not lead 
to permanent changes in this regard. This impression is strengthened if we look to the 
right hand side panel of Table 3. Total investment and reinvestment effects are negative 
– see coefficients in Panel A (−0.3960 and −0.4429) and in Panel B of Table 3 (−0.2329 
and −0.3682). The negative effect on reinvestment may be due to the fact that capital 
stock was renewed during the CLP period and therefore in the following years the firms 
had less need to reinvest. The capital widening in the post CLP period – cf. line ∆ net 
investment on the right hand side of Table 3 – demonstrates positive but insignificant 
spillover effects.
Furthermore, we compare the investment activities of group CLP = 1 with those of 
different other groups. This approach allows us to differentiate between investment 
effects of further phases. We have information on whether,
•	 An agreement existed in the past and is now discontinued;
•	 There are currently negotiations under way for such an agreement;
•	 The efforts to achieve a CLP have failed in the past.
The outcome of the comparisons can be found in Table 4, where firms with different CLP 
phases are matched with firms that did not have a CLP. In lines (1A), (1B), (2A) and 
Table 3. The investment effects of adoption and expiring of CLPs.
 Adopted CLP Expired CLP




21,160 0.1910** 0.0834 1027 −0.3960 0.3641
∆ reinvestment 20,568 0.2235*** 0.0803 989 −0.4429 0.3465




16,505 0.1943* 0.1188 784 −0.2329 0.4610
∆ reinvestment 16,035 0.1970* 0.1197 755 −0.3682 0.4025
∆ net investment 16,044 0.0285 0.0259 755 0.0893 0.1603
Notes: * significant at the 10% level; ** significant at the 5% level; *** significant at the 1% level. Cluster ro-
bust standard errors with respect to the firms are presented. The control variables are change of firm size, 
bargaining, works council, profit sharing, time and industry dummies. In the left hand side panel, firms who 
have adopted a CLP in period t are compared with all other firms. In the right hand side panel, firms whose 
pact has expired in period t are only compared with firms in which a pact still exists.
Source: IAB Establishment Panel, 2001–2010.
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(2B), we can see that investment is not higher during the negotiation on a CLP agreement 
compared with firms with an adopted CLP and with firms with no CLP. Furthermore, 
investment in firms that are currently negotiating a CLP agreement is lower than in firms 
with pacts in the past or than in firms in which efforts to achieve an agreement failed in 
the past. This outcome is not only the case for total investment but also for reinvestment 
and for net investment. These results are not presented in the tables.
We should note that establishments that had pacts in the past or that have attempted to 
negotiate pacts invest less than establishments without any pacts during the studied 
period, including the recession phase 2009 – see lines (3A) and (4A) of Table 4. Although 
these effects are insignificant, this finding is evidence that investment behaviour is not 
completely stabilized by CLPs. If CLPs have expired and the firms are affected by a 
crisis, CLPs reduce firm investment activities. In the pre-recession period – see line (3B) 
– total investment in establishments with pacts in the past is higher than investment by 
establishments without any pacts.
Conclusion
Our estimates reveal positive coefficients of CLPs for both total and replacement invest-
ments. If locational investments are explicitly agreed to in CLPs, the effects are signifi-
cant. Otherwise, the effects are often statistically insignificant. This result is consistent 
with those of other empirical studies that analyse the correlation between the existence 
of works councils and investments. The positive coefficients suggest that CLPs induce 
(replacement) investments in the majority of establishments under normal economic 
Table 4. The investment effects of CLPs under alternative treatment and control groups.
Treatment group Control group N Coef. SE
Panel A: 2001–2009
(1A) CLP NCLP 1108 0.1154** 0.0603
(2A) NCLP NOCLP 15,463 −0.1098* 0.0639
(3A) PCLP NOCLP 15,457 −0.0095 0.0624
(4A) FCLP NOCLP 15,508 −0.0956 0.0776
Panel B: 2001–2008
(1B) CLP NCLP 798 0.1301* 0.0743
(2B) NCLP NOCLP 11,749 −0.0853 0.0679
(3B) PCLP NOCLP 11,739 0.0065 0.0737
(4B) FCLP NOCLP 11,780 −0.0598 0.0860
Notes: * significant at the 10% level; ** significant at the 5% level; *** significant at the 1% level. Cluster ro-
bust standard errors with respect to the firms are presented. Control variables are the same as in Table A2.
CLP: with company-level pact.
NCLP: planned company-level pact, ongoing negotiations.
NOCLP: no company-level pact.
PCLP: company-level pact in the past, expired.
FCLP: planned company-level pact, but negotiations failed.
Source: IAB Establishment Panel, 2001–2010.
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conditions. Strong variations in investment behaviours of firms and imprecise standard 
errors may be responsible for the insignificance of the effects when locational invest-
ments are not agreed to. The implied modernization of an establishment’s capital stock is 
driven by reinvestment rather than by net investment. The latter is declining under CLPs, 
and this result is statistically significant. Generally, firms respond to critical economic 
situations by investing less, which is especially true with regard to the Great Recession. 
The contrast between the effects on replacement investments and net investments under 
company-level pacts demonstrates that CLPs do not successfully contribute to the growth 
of the firm’s capital stock but only contribute to the consolidation and modernization of 
the capital stock. This is not surprising because CLPs are usually not long-lasting, espe-
cially if the CLP is installed during a crisis when the establishment is facing a problem 
with competitiveness but not a problem related to a lack of capacities. Therefore, growth 
of the capital stock is not the objective; rather the aim is modernization of the stock.
Our findings are mixed with respect to the level of firm investment during different 
phases of a CLP. First, we cannot detect any positive increase in investment during the 
negotiation phase. Second, firm investment behaviour is ambiguous for the duration of a 
finalized CLP. We find that, after the expiration of a CLP, lower reinvestment and a small 
increase in net investment occurs. Third, total investment during the phase following the 
expiration of a CLP is less than it is during the contract phase. Furthermore, with the 
exception of economic slumps, the total investment for firms with CLPs remains greater 
than investments for firms that never had CLPs. However, the significantly positive 
adoption effects of a CLP on reinvestment do not seem permanent. Additionally, the 
results are strongly affected by the Great Recession. We observe an increase in diminish-
ing or disappearing investments. It is also noted that firm compliance with agreements 
that are of significant length appears to be lower than that of firms with shorter 
agreements.
Further research requires data from longer periods where more information regard-
ing financial limitations on investments, on cash flows and on expectations is availa-
ble. It is of interest to determine whether and why firms are reluctant to invest despite 
the high profits derived from investments. Are unrealistic ambitious profit aims or 
negative developments on the financial markets responsible? In 1998, the European 
Foundation of Living and Working Conditions launched a large international study 
about the nature and extent of CLPs, including the content of these pacts. A new study 
should be conducted in the face of an ongoing crisis. Furthermore, empirical investiga-
tions should simultaneously analyse the effects on employment and investment and 
should focus more on the influence of specific measures and the specific mixture of 
measures in relation to the cyclical development of firm investment. Company-level 
pacts can improve the competitiveness of an establishment. Nevertheless, permanent 
CLPs are usually not promising as employees are not willing to accept concessions 
over a long period without balanced returns. In fact, employees react to the unbalanced 
returns to their concessions by working at a lower level of productivity or by quitting 
when other firms supply better labour conditions. Permanent derogations from collec-
tive contracts are not useful because such exemptions decrease the incentives for firms 
to become as profitable as those competitors who fulfil completely the norms of col-
lective bargaining agreements.
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Currently, an empirical comparison between the effects of CLPs on investments as 
determined in our investigation with other countries is not possible. As the investiga-
tions using data from other countries are usually case studies or are focused on deter-
minants of concession bargaining, they do not analyse investment effects under specific 
company measures. Accordingly, it would be useful if future econometric investiga-
tions are extended in a comparable way to other countries. In conjunction with the 
enormous economic problems, more CLPs may be adopted, especially in South Europe. 
In these countries the problems cannot be solved by macroeconomic policy measures 
alone.
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Table A1. Probit estimation of CLP.
 Panel A: 2001–2009 Panel B: 2001–2008
Coef. Robust SE Coef. Robust SE
Opening clause 0.3219*** 0.0458 0.3308*** 0.0529
Company agreement 0.3366*** 0.0542 0.3748*** 0.0619
Number of employees/1000 0.0565** 0.0225 0.0443** 0.0201
Lagged growth rate of capital 
stock
−0.0415** 0.0207 −0.0425* 0.0249
Growth in sales 0.0465 0.0560 0.0628 0.0616
Lagged growth in sales −0.2679*** 0.0590 −0.0498 0.0828
Log of the capital–sales ratio 0.0161 0.0159 0.0158 0.0186
Log of sales 0.1382*** 0.0147 0.1298*** 0.0168
Construction −0.3000*** 0.0845 −0.3347*** 0.0992
Trade −0.3004*** 0.0731 −0.2874*** 0.0863
Traffic −0.0318 0.0883 −0.0148 0.1005
Company services −0.2719*** 0.0779 −0.3500*** 0.0985
Other services −0.1510** 0.0772 −0.2124** 0.0968
Central bargaining 0.2288*** 0.0443 0.2956*** 0.0606
Works council 0.7995*** 0.0566 0.8221*** 0.0659
Profit sharing −0.2228*** 0.0443 −0.1849*** 0.0526
Const. −3.9635*** 0.2548 −3.9785*** 0.2974
Number of observations 16,462 12,557
Wald chi²(15) 1821.46 1296.95
Prob > chi² 0.0000 0.0000
Pseudo R² 0.3380 0.3472
Source: IAB Establishment Panel, 2001–2010.
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Table A2. Effects of CLPs on total investment (the growth rate of capital stock) – standard 
model 2001–2009.
 OLS IV
Coef. SE Coef. SE
Company-level pact (CLP) 0.0424 0.0614 0.1341 0.3618
Number of employees/1000 0.1150* 0.0686  
Lagged GRC −0.0117*** 0.0041 −0.0123*** 0.0041
Growth in sales 0.0682 0.0471 0.0633** 0.0361
Lagged growth in sales −0.0557 0.0401 −0.0590 0.0374
Log of the capital–sales ratio −0.2880*** 0.0267 −0.2209*** 0.0106
Log of sales −0.0455*** 0.0124 −0.0320*** 0.0117
Construction −0.2061*** 0.0549 −0.1706*** 0.0475
Trade −0.2669*** 0.0678 −0.1570*** 0.0437
Traffic 0.0973 0.0827 0.0537 0.0725
Telecommunications 0.0532 0.0796 0.0420 0.6080
Company services −0.1690*** 0.0470 −0.1205*** 0.0431
Other services −0.0696 0.0522 −0.0109 0.0470
Central bargaining −0.0194 0.0366 −0.0015 0.0327
Works council 0.0307 0.0531 0.0005 0.0632
Profit sharing −0.0332 0.0425 −0.0163 0.0395
Const. 0.4188** 0.1974 0.3110 0.1824
Number of observations 16,599 16,470
R² 0.0363 0.0282
Notes: * significant at the 10% level; ** significant at the 5% level; *** significant at the 1% level. Cluster ro-
bust standard errors with respect to the firms are presented. GRC is the growth rate of the capital stock. 
In the IV estimates CLP is instrumented by a dummy ‘opening clause (OC) = 1, if yes; = 0 otherwise’, by a 
dummy ‘company agreement (CA) = 1, if yes; = 0 otherwise’ and by the total numbers of employees (NoE).
Source: IAB Establishment Panel, 2001–2010.






2001–2007 8784 0.0946 0.1079 0.0849 0.1166
2006 3016 0.2799 0.2669 0.2041 0.2752
2007 3344 0.0421 0.0693 0.0403 0.1028
2008 3765 0.1094* 0.0586 0.0012 0.0994
2009 3929 −0.1085 0.0765 −0.1895* 0.1134
Notes: * significant at the 10% level; ** significant at the 5% level; *** significant at the 1% level. The coeffi-
cient of the CLP dummy variable on total investment and cluster robust standard errors with respect to the 
firms are presented. The same control variables are incorporated as in Appendix Table A2.
Source: IAB Establishment Panel, 2001–2010.
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Table A4. Robustness checks of the standard model.
Panel A: 2001–2009 Panel B: 2001–2008
 N Coef. SE N Coef. SE
(1) Parsimonious 
specificationa
19,466 0.0552 0.0541 15,492 0.0855 0.0575
(2) Mairesse approachb 19,469 0.1445* 0.0810 15,485 0.1956 0.1017
(3) ADL(1,1)c 19,501 0.0190 0.0568 15,422 0.0575 0.0609
(4) Extended specificationd 19,417 0.0856 0.0854 15,439 0.1433 0.1072
(5) Hausman–Taylore 15,994 0.0008 0.0114 12,174 0.0123 0.0153
Notes: * significant at the 10% level; ** significant at the 5% level; *** significant at the 1% level. The coef-
ficient of the CLP dummy variable on total investment and cluster robust standard errors with respect to 
the firms are presented.
aStandard model without central bargaining, works council and profit sharing as control variables.
b Regressors: lagged growth rate of capital stock, growth in sales, lagged growth in sales, log of the capital– 
output ratio, log of sales and CLP dummy.
cAutoregressive distributed lag model: ADL(1,1) instead of ADL(2,2) as in the other specifications.
dWith time dummies as additional control variables to the standard mode.
eHausman–Taylor panel estimator.
Source: IAB Establishment Panel, 2001–2010.
